President Tshisekedi on a visit in China in 2023
In the intricate web of global geopolitics and resource diplomacy, few nations have captured as much attention—and frustration—as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under President Félix Tshisekedi’s leadership, the DRC has become a focal point for international powers seeking access to its minerals, particularly rare earths, cobalt and copper.
However, recent developments suggest that trust remains a fragile commodity in Kinshasa’s dealings with foreign partners. From broken promises to shifting goalposts, the DRC’s engagements—whether with China or Rwanda—have consistently raised eyebrows about the country’s reliability as a partner.
For China, which has invested billions into Congolese mining ventures, the question is clear: Can Tshisekedi ever be trusted?
The Chinese Gambit: A Tale of Broken Promises
China’s relationship with the DRC dates back to the early 2000s, when Beijing began positioning itself as a key player in Africa’s economic transformation. In 2008, the DRC signed what was heralded as a landmark deal—a $6 billion “minerals-for-infrastructure” agreement. This ambitious arrangement promised to exchange the DRC’s mineral resources for roads, railways, hospitals, and schools built by Chinese firms like Sinohydro and China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC).
On paper, it seemed like a win-win scenario: China would secure critical raw materials needed for its booming industries, while the DRC would receive much-needed infrastructure development. But reality painted a different picture. Years later, audits revealed little progress on the ground. Roads remained unpaved, railways incomplete, and hospitals unbuilt. Corruption, mismanagement, and a lack of enforcement mechanisms turned what should have been a transformative partnership into a cautionary tale.
Fast forward to 2016, when China Molybdenum Co. (CMOC) acquired a majority stake in the Tenke Fungurume mine—one of the world’s largest sources of cobalt. The deal was supposed to usher in an era of mutual prosperity. Yet, just six years later, accusations flew thick and fast. In 2022, Kinshasa accused CMOC of hiding profits, alleging that the company had underreported earnings to avoid paying fair royalties to the state-owned Gecamines. By 2023, exports from the mine were abruptly halted, leading to arbitration proceedings and further souring relations between the two sides.
For China, this experience underscores the challenges of doing business in the DRC. While Beijing has long prided itself on non-interference in domestic affairs, its patience appears to be wearing thin. The repeated allegations of corruption and the ever-shifting regulatory landscape make it difficult for even seasoned negotiators to navigate Kinshasa’s murky waters. As one analyst put it, “China knows better now than to take promises at face value.”
Shifting Alliances: From China to the US
Against this backdrop of strained ties with China, the DRC has begun exploring new partnerships—most notably with the United States. In 2025, rumors have swirled that Kinshasa is considering a major mineral deal with Washington, potentially granting American companies access to the country’s cobalt reserves. In exchange, the U.S. has reportedly offered military support against rebel offensives in eastern Congo, where armed groups continue to destabilize the region.
This pivot toward the West comes amid growing geopolitical tensions between China and the U.S., with both superpowers vying for influence in resource-rich Africa. For Tshisekedi, aligning with Washington may seem like a pragmatic move, especially given the Biden and Trump administration’s emphasis on securing supply chains for green energy technologies. But skeptics argue that such deals are unlikely to succeed without addressing the underlying issues plaguing the DRC’s governance structure.
If past experiences are anything to go by, there’s reason to doubt whether the DRC can honor commitments made to its new suitor. After all, if China—a nation accustomed to navigating complex environments—struggled to enforce agreements, how will the U.S., with its stricter regulatory standards, fare any better? Moreover, the DRC’s history of changing goalposts mid-deal raises legitimate concerns about the sustainability of these arrangements.
Changing Goalposts: Lessons from Engagement with Rwanda
To understand the DRC’s approach to international partnerships, one need only look at its tumultuous relationship with Rwanda. Over the past three decades, the two countries have oscillated between cooperation and conflict, often driven by shifting political priorities rather than genuine reconciliation efforts.
Take, for instance, the ongoing tensions over the M23 rebel group, which many accuse Kigali of supporting. Despite numerous peace talks facilitated by regional bodies like the East African Community (EAC), little progress has been achieved. Instead, the DRC has repeatedly changed its stance, sometimes accusing Rwanda of aggression, other times calling for dialogue, depending on the prevailing winds of diplomatic pressure.
A striking example occurred a few weeks ago when Kinshasa initially blamed the M23-AFC rebels for blocking the reopening of Goma International Airport. However, revelations by Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe exposed a deeper truth: the real obstacle was a restrictive Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) issued by the DRC government itself. This sudden shift in narrative highlights a pattern of opportunistic behavior, where alliances and accusations are deployed tactically rather than strategically.
Such actions erode trust not only with immediate neighbors but also with broader stakeholders. If the DRC cannot maintain consistency in its engagements—even with a close neighbor like Rwanda—it becomes increasingly difficult for external actors to view Kinshasa as a reliable partner.
Shopping for an International Coalition Instead of Fixing Problems
Instead of taking steps to develop trustworthy engagement with potential partners and neighbors, Tshisekedi went shopping for an international coalition. By the end, he had SAMIDRC from SADC, MONUSCO forces, Burundian forces, European mercenaries, Rwandan FDLR militia, and local civilian militia called Wazalendo. But that didn’t lead anywhere.
The Congolese FARDC soldiers knew Tshisekedi doesn’t consider them important, so they couldn’t fight for a government that had abandoned them. While thousands of dollars were paid daily to European mercenaries, FARDC units starved in the bushes, lacking food, equipment, and even basic salaries. This blatant disregard for his own national army has further eroded confidence in Tshisekedi’s leadership—both domestically and internationally.
At the heart of these challenges lies the DRC’s governance deficit. Decades of corruption, weak institutions, and opaque decision-making processes have created an environment where accountability is virtually nonexistent. For foreign investors and partners, this translates into heightened risks and uncertainty.
Had there been robust oversight mechanisms in place, many of these disputes might never have arisen—or could have been resolved swiftly through transparent channels. Instead, disputes drag on, culminating in costly legal battles and damaged reputations on both sides.
Similarly, the failure to deliver on the 2008 minerals-for-infrastructure deal reflects systemic issues within the DRC’s bureaucracy. Without addressing these structural flaws, no amount of foreign investment or aid will yield meaningful results. As long as elites prioritize personal gain over national interests, the cycle of broken promises will persist.
As the DRC navigates its role on the global stage, the question looms large: Can Tshisekedi ever be trusted? For China, which has already endured significant setbacks in its dealings with Kinshasa, the answer seems increasingly uncertain. Meanwhile, the U.S. and others contemplating partnerships with the DRC would do well to heed the lessons of history.
Ultimately, the ball is in Tshisekedi’s court. Will he rise to the occasion, transforming the DRC into a dependable partner capable of fulfilling its immense potential? Or will the same old patterns of deception and mismanagement prevail, ensuring that the country remains a cautionary tale in the annals of international diplomacy?
Only time—and action—will tell.
