M23 rebels man a position overlooking Goma, in the shadow of the Nyiragongo Volcano, in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) June 07, 2013. (Photo: Jerome Starkey)
The ongoing M23 rebellion in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has sparked significant debate regarding its origins, motivations, and external backers. While DRC authorities have often pointed fingers at Rwanda for allegedly supporting the group, a deeper analysis reveals that Uganda has a far more substantial connection to M23.
Here, we explore the historical and current links between M23 and Uganda, while also examining the political dynamics that have shaped perceptions of Rwanda’s alleged role.
Historical Context of M23 Leadership and Rank-and-File
Following their defeat in 2013, M23 rebels scattered across the region. While some sought refuge in Rwanda, the majority, including the group’s key leaders and rank-and-file members, relocated to Uganda. This is corroborated by reports from the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC, which documented the presence of M23 fighters in Uganda. These fighters remained inactive for years, suggesting tacit acceptance or even protection by Ugandan authorities. By contrast, those who fled to Rwanda were disarmed and integrated into camps under international supervision, where they remain to this day.
The resurgence of M23 in 2022 points to Uganda’s role as a key enabler. Many of the current M23 leaders reportedly operated freely in Uganda, where they established businesses and maintained access to resources. This aligns with statements by Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi, who initiated contact with M23 leaders from Uganda during the early days of his administration. Reports indicate that Uganda facilitated these interactions, with the intention of leveraging M23 as a tool for influence in eastern DRC.
Strategic Geography: Uganda’s Border and M23 Activities
M23’s current operational base in eastern DRC is concentrated around Bunagana, a strategic town directly bordering Uganda. This location underscores Uganda’s logistical significance for the group. Supplies, reinforcements, and financial support can easily flow from Uganda into rebel-held territories, bypassing Rwandan borders entirely. By contrast, Rwanda’s geographical position relative to M23 strongholds makes its alleged logistical support far less plausible.
Moreover, Ugandan political and military figures have demonstrated an overt affinity for M23. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the son of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, and head of Uganda’s military, has publicly expressed admiration for the group. Such statements suggest a level of ideological alignment and potential covert support, further implicating Uganda as a primary external actor in the rebellion.
M23 leaders’ economic activities in Uganda further highlight their dependence on the country. Several commanders reportedly own property and businesses in Uganda, enabling them to sustain their operations. This economic integration into Uganda’s system reflects a long-standing relationship between the group and its host country.
This is Bunagana from above, directly bordering Uganda, and far away from Rwanda. It is where M23 transits all its needs and supplies.
Additionally, Uganda’s involvement in the DRC is multifaceted. While officially deployed to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) under a joint agreement with Kinshasa, Uganda’s military presence also provides cover for other activities. The coexistence of Ugandan troops and M23 rebels in the same regions raises questions about potential coordination or, at the very least, a mutual understanding.
Rwanda’s Denial and Tshisekedi’s Political Calculations
Rwandan President Paul Kagame recently reiterated that Rwanda has no involvement with M23. This denial aligns with Rwanda’s historical approach of disarming and containing M23 fighters within its borders. Rwanda’s position is further supported by the lack of credible evidence linking it to the group’s resurgence in 2022. Instead, the accusations against Rwanda appear to stem from a broader political strategy by DRC authorities.
President Tshisekedi’s alignment with Uganda suggests a deliberate effort to shift blame onto Rwanda. This aligns with Uganda’s long-standing rivalry with Rwanda, marked by historical attempts to undermine President Kagame’s government. As far back as 1996, Ugandan officials, including General Salim Saleh, were implicated in plans to support Rwandan exiles seeking to overthrow Kagame. This history of antagonism provides context for the current narrative linking Rwanda to M23.
Further evidence of Uganda’s involvement in subversive activities against Rwanda can be found in the revelations made by President Kagame himself. In a speech during the 16th government retreat in 2019, Kagame highlighted Uganda’s role in aiding Rwanda’s enemies over the past two decades. He described specific incidents, such as Uganda’s support for the Rwandan National Congress (RNC) and its leaders like Kayumba Nyamwasa, as well as the arrest and torture of Rwandans like Rene Rutagungira. Kagame also pointed out Uganda’s relationship with figures like Tribert Rujugiro, a wealthy Rwandan tycoon accused of funding subversive activities against Rwanda. Rujugiro has since died. Kagame’s speech underscores Uganda’s persistent involvement in activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda.
Additionally, Kagame referenced a series of meetings in 1998 between Seth Sendashonga, a former Rwandan internal security minister-turned-dissident, and Ugandan Generals including Gen. Saleh, as documented by French author Gérard Prunier in his book “Africa’s World War.” In this meeting, Sendashonga was reportedly encouraged to mobilize Rwandan exiles for rebellion against Kigali. These historical connections further highlight Uganda’s role in fostering anti-Rwanda sentiments and activities.
Uganda’s Broader Role in Regional Politics
Uganda’s strategic interests in the Great Lakes region extend beyond M23. Museveni has consistently provided refuge to Rwandan dissidents, including political and military figures opposed to Kagame. This policy aligns with Uganda’s historical role as a hub for exiled opposition groups. The presence of such individuals in Uganda underscores the country’s willingness to host actors hostile to Rwanda.
President Museveni holding a meeting with President Felix Tshisekedi of DR Congo at State House Entebbe on Wednesday. The DRC President is in Uganda on a one day working visit, October 30, 2024
Additionally, Museveni’s influence over Tshisekedi has grown significantly, as evidenced by joint military operations and coordinated political strategies. This partnership suggests a broader agenda to isolate Rwanda regionally. By framing Rwanda as the primary supporter of M23, Uganda and DRC aim to weaken Kagame’s government diplomatically and strategically.
The Narrative of Regime Change
The framing of Rwanda as M23’s sponsor also aligns with long-standing agenda of regime change targeting Kagame. Critics of Kagame’s government, including exiled opposition figures and regional actors, have historically sought to destabilize Rwanda. Museveni’s involvement in these efforts, dating back to his collaboration with exiled Rwandan politicians in the 1990s, reflects a persistent pattern.
The current narrative serves to discredit Rwanda internationally while bolstering Uganda’s regional influence. By positioning itself as an ally to the DRC, Uganda seeks to reshape regional dynamics in its favor. This strategy not only isolates Rwanda but also consolidates Museveni’s influence over Tshisekedi, ensuring Uganda’s dominance in the Great Lakes region.
While Rwanda remains a convenient scapegoat for M23’s activities, the evidence points to Uganda as the group’s primary external enabler. From hosting M23’s leadership to facilitating their resurgence, Uganda’s role is both direct and significant. The geographical, economic, and political ties between Uganda and M23 further underscore this connection.
By contrast, Rwanda’s alleged involvement appears to be part of a broader political strategy aimed at isolating Kagame’s government. Tshisekedi’s alignment with Museveni reflects a calculated effort to shift blame onto Rwanda, despite Uganda’s well-documented links to M23. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for addressing the root causes of the conflict and fostering genuine regional stability.
